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Contrary to popular sentiment, if it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, that 
doesn’t mean it is a duck. In Ukraine today, there is an institution that toils like a 
parliament and sounds like a parliament, but clearly is not a parliament.  
 
Instead, Ukraine’s once vibrant, dynamic legislative body has begun to resemble 
a rump debating club, except that everyone agrees with everyone else, and no 
one outside the club is listening. Moreover, as this “debating” continues, 
Ukraine’s highest political leaders snipe, grumble and point at each other, 
creating a cacophony of noise that makes it nearly impossible for the average 
person to understand what is going on. When asked about their parliament or 
their government in general, average Ukrainians shrug or sigh, while international 
political observers worry that the country’s reputation has suffered significantly. 
 
The sighs increased in the last two weeks, as 255 members of the parliament 
continued meeting and voting, even though over 150 opposition MPs had 
resigned, thus making the body constitutionally illegitimate. According to a 
political agreement signed by President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister Viktor 
Yanukovych and Parliamentary Speaker Oleksandr Moroz on 27 May, these 
resignations should have triggered the parliament to dissolve itself, in anticipation 
of new elections on 30 September. 
 
But, as has become very clear in the last several years, signed agreements in 
Ukraine mean very little. Moroz and Yanukovych have refused to dissolve 
parliament, leading to a war of words, with both sides accusing the other of 
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violating the constitution. It is a disappointing turn of events in the country that 
captured the world’s attention during the Orange Revolution. 
 
What happened?  
This crisis is the latest in a string of crises that has stalled or slowed the work of 
state institutions for more than a third of Yushchenko’s nearly two and a half 
years in office. Fully 10 out of 28 of those months have been engulfed by political 
crises, with other months also affected to varying degrees. 
 
On 2 April, Yushchenko issued a decree dissolving parliament, because of what 
he called the “unconstitutional process in the formation of the parliamentary 
majority coalition.” (1) He suggested that this process violated the mechanisms, 
articulated in Article 83 of the Constitution, regarding majority formation. 
Specifically, the president suggested that inclusion of individual deputies in the 
majority coalition violated the Article’s requirement that majorities only include full 
factions and that the majority be created within one month after the election. 
 
Of most concern to Yushchenko was the fact that the parliamentary majority had 
grown quickly from 232 members to at least 250. The President faced the real 
possibility that the majority would be enlarged to 301 (based on member 
defections from factions), the number needed for overrides and constitutional 
amendments. 
 
Additionally, Yushchenko and opposition activists had become concerned at 
what they viewed as a return to some of the tactics used prior to the Orange 
Revolution. These included police investigations of political opponents, legal and 
physical pressure on the media, and the alleged intimidation of parliamentary 
deputies to either change their factions or their vote.  
 
Opposition leaders had become especially alarmed after representatives from 
the Prosecutor-General’s Office (PGO) suddenly searched the apartment of 
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former Interior Minister and former Orange Revolution organizer Yuriy Lutsenko 
and then accepted a request from the parliament to examine opposition leader 
Yulia Tymoshenko’s dealings as head of a gas intermediary in the mid-1990s. 
Both Lutsenko and Tymoshenko had announced that they would lead major 
protest actions against the government. 
 
At the same time, the Ukrainian National Television Channel 1 cancelled its only 
political debate program, “Toloka,” after Tymoshenko and Vyacheslav Kyrylenko 
of Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc appeared on the program. (2) 
 
The root of the problem, though, stems from constitutional amendments hastily 
adopted during the tail end of the Orange Revolution. The amendments create a 
perpetual struggle for control between the presidency and the premiership by not 
delineating spheres of responsibility in some areas, and by assigning duplicate 
responsibilities to both offices in other areas.  
 
In May, the recent crisis expanded frighteningly beyond the bounds of normalcy 
even for Ukraine, when each side mobilized troops or police and attempted to 
take control of the Office of the Prosecutor General. It was at this point that 
Yushchenko, Yanukovych and Moroz defused the crisis by signing an agreement 
to hold new elections on 30 September. 
 
The latest political agreement 
The agreement included a provision for the dismissed parliament to return to 
work for two days, in order to pass legislation to finance an election, as well as 
several other essential economic measures. Upon completing these bills, the 
opposition factions were to dissolve themselves, thereby removing the 
parliamentary quorum and triggering a new election. The opposition Our Ukraine 
and Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc factions did so on 2 and 3 June, while also “zeroing” 
the bottom of their election lists to remove the possibility of replacements. 
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Then, Speaker Moroz suddenly refused to accept that the opposition had 
resigned, while also refusing to accept that the president had dissolved the 
parliament again by decree. Moroz suddenly introduced new administrative 
procedures dealing with deputy resignations—procedures not voted on by the 
parliament—and claimed that the 30 September agreement had been 
“completely misinterpreted.” (3) He alternatively claimed that he hadn’t received 
the requisite 151 resignations at all, and then stated that the resignations were 
completed inappropriately. Finally, he claimed opposition deputies had been 
forced to resign and had privately recanted their resignations. He repeatedly 
claimed that these deputies would soon make public their recantations, but as of 
yet, none have done so.  
 
In reality, according to the constitution, it doesn’t matter what Moroz says or does. 
 
Article 81 (Point 6) of Ukraine’s constitution states (in full with emphasis added): 
 
“Where a National Deputy of Ukraine, as having been elected from a political 
party (an electoral bloc of political parties), fails to join the parliamentary faction 
representing the same political party (the same electoral bloc of political 
parties) or withdraws from such a faction, the highest steering body of the 
respective political party (electoral bloc of political parties) shall decide to 
terminate early his or her powers on the basis of a law, with the termination 
taking effect on the date of such a decision.” 
 
Each opposition deputy, therefore, withdrew from his/her faction. The “steering 
body” of both blocs then voted to terminate the powers of those who had 
withdrawn, thereby immediately removing their deputy mandates and eliminating 
the parliamentary quorum. 
 
This is clearly a complicated and potentially dangerous provision (theoretically 
allowing any opposition to easily trigger new elections) but it is, nonetheless, a 
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constitutional point. The parliament is provided no constitutional right to interject 
itself into the decisions of the factions in any way. 
 
The parliament’s administrative office seemed to understand this constitutional 
issue better than Moroz. On 7 June, the office confirmed to The Yulia 
Tymoshenko Bloc that it had received and validated 103 resignations from its 
faction. (4) This, plus 66 resignations from the president’s Our Ukraine bloc, 
clearly makes the body illegitimate, or not “plenipotentiary,” in the words of the 
constitution (Article 82). 
 
Lacking legal basis, Moroz’s actions then seem to be based solely on polls 
showing that his Socialist Party will be kicked out of parliament in the upcoming 
election. What his stance is doing to the country, however, is of most concern to 
those following the country’s political transition from a semi-authoritarian to 
democratic state. 
 
The courts and highest Ukrainian institutions have shown themselves unable to 
solve the political crisis. Judges have been dismissed, pressured and 
investigated (often for good reason). Lawmakers report significant intimidation 
and offers of “compensation.” The media has shown itself unable to clearly 
delineate what is happening, although they continue to criticize and examine the 
work of their politicians. 
 
This country that aspires to join Europe’s institutions has demonstrated very little 
of the political sophistication necessary to do so. 
 
Despite Moroz’s opposition, however, it is likely the election will occur on 30 
September. Tymoshenko recently said her bloc would meet any of Moroz’s new 
rules in order to ensure that the election takes place as planned. 
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When it does, polls show that a coalition supporting Yanukovych and a pro-
presidential coalition led by Tymoshenko will finish neck-and-neck. Perhaps it is 
for this reason that Yanukovych reportedly now is urging his party members to 
stop their parliamentary jostling and go out into the regions to campaign. They 
undoubtedly will do so when Moroz finally lets them. 
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